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LAW AND RELIGION' 
I 
THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH AND THE LAW 
AW is a word of many meanings. I n  the sense in which I L shall be using it, in the sense of law with which lawyers 
are concerned, it has no less than three meanings. One sense 
is what may be called the legal order, the regime of adjusting 
relations and ordering conduct through the systematic and 
orderly application of the force of politically organized so- 
ciety. A second sense is the one in which the term has been 
commonly understood by lawyers since the study of Roman 
law in the twelfth-century universities, namely, the body of 
authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative deter- 
mination by which judges and administrative officials are 
held bound to  exercise their office. A third is what Mr. 
Justice Cardozo happily called the judicial process, t o  which 
we must now add the administrative process, t ha t  is, the 
process of objectively maintaining the legal order through 
decisions and determinations reached by applying an author- 
itative technique t o  the authoritative grounds of decision. 
But  what, as men have thought in the past, has entitled 
each of these three meanings to  acquire and keep the name of 
law is an ideal behind each of them-an ideal of something 
firm and constant and stable to  which human behavior is t o  
be molded as a check on the primitive behavior tendencies 
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that  make for unbridled individual self-assertion; a picture 
of a reasoned adjustment t o  the human environment of the 
individual, making possible division of labor and so leaving 
men free for research and experiment and invention and all 
that  underlies our economic order and mechanical develop- 
ment. Today this element, which I made prominent in de- 
fining each of the three meanings of law, is challenged by 
a group of self-styled advanced thinkers in all parts of the 
world, but  especially active in America. They raise a ques- 
tion as t o  the legal order, asking, is it a systematic and orderly 
adjusting of relations by politically organized society or is it 
just an ordering by the force of such a society, the quality of 
which is irrelevant? And they answer their question by saying 
that it is a process of ordering society. When we think, as we 
used to, that  this process may be carried on according to  law 
or against law or without law, we are told that we are bring- 
ing in irrelevant and unscientific notions. In  like manner, 
they raise a question as t o  the authoritative guides to  deter- 
mination. For centuries men have regarded them as reasoned 
expressions of an idea of justice. They ask whether we have 
anything more than arbitrarily made rules imposed by those 
who wield the force of politically organized society. In  this 
way of thinking law is an aggregate of laws, and a law is a 
threat of application of state force. Similarly as t o  the third 
meaning, they question whether it is an objective process of 
applying an authoritative technique and urge that it is no 
more than a process of determination on the basis of the 
personal class self-interest or temperament or prejudices of 
the magistrate. 
One might suppose that the spectacle of the process of 
ordering society carried on in more than one part of the 
world today as something dependent on the will of one man 
might enable these self-styled advanced thinkers t o  compare 
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it with the legal order, the body of guides to  decision, and the 
judicial process in the English-speaking world and ask them- 
selves whether perhaps their advanced thought may have 
been advancing backwards. At any rate, the questions which 
they ask are not a t  all new. They were raised by Greek 
philosophers as far back as the fifth century B.C. They 
argued, as we are doing today, whether men’s relations with 
each other were adjusted, their disputes were determined, 
and their claims and desires were harmonized in action by 
arbitrary precepts, arbitrarily applied by those who wielded 
political power in the time and place, or rather by precepts 
of general application grounded on reason and justice. 
Democritus, a precursor of Epicurus and so of materialism, 
held that  law was something made, in contrast with what 
exists by nature. It was a stock doctrine of the Sophists that  
the just was such only by convention and enactment. Antis- 
thenes, the founder of the Cynics, laid down that  all laws 
got their sole validity from enactment. There was no ideal 
behind a legal precept which i t  sought t o  express and declare. 
What  men had taken t o  be behind it was a result of the ex- 
istence of the precept by custom or enactment. Socrates, on 
the other hand, said that  law was a discovery of the reality 
in relations-that is, of the ideally significant. It was found, 
not made. I n  one form or another, jurists have carried on 
this debate ever since. 
I n  this country, under the influence of Marx’s economic 
interpretation, the Sophists’ way of thinking has been re- 
vived in a new form for the modern world, though one 
familiar t o  the Greeks. We are told that  justice is no more 
than the will of the socially dominant class, dictated by its 
self-interest, imposed on those on whom it is able t o  impose 
its authority. T h e  legal order is a regime of subjecting an 
economically subject class t o  the will of a socially and eco- 
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nomically ruling class. Law in the second sense is a body of 
precepts formulating this will. The judicial process is a 
process of determining controversies so as t o  maintain the 
self-interest of the dominant class and nothing more. Hence, 
one of the leaders among American self-styled realists tells 
us t ha t  law is whatever is done officially. It is what judges 
and magistrates and administrative officials of every sort do 
about men’s disputes and is law because they do it. One of 
the leaders among the realists in Europe tells us that  it is not 
that  there is a law of property because men seek to  be secure 
in what they have discovered or made or amassed. They 
claim t o  be secure in those acquisitions because there is a law 
of property. It is not that  there is law because men make 
just claims and just men seek to  secure them in those claims. 
Men make claims and desire them secured because the law 
teaches them to  do so. The idea of right or a right is wholly 
rejected. There are only “situations in which, on account of 
certain rules maintained by force, certain acts give rise to  
certain effects.” As the official exponent of Marx, lately 
adviser t o  the Soviet government, put it, in the ideal society 
there will be no law, or rather but one rule of law, namely, 
t ha t  there are no laws but only administrative ordinances 
and orders. Thus the process which our American advanced 
thinkers call law, the Russian advanced thinker of yesterday 
had advanced t o  see as a doing away with law. 
Judges and administrative officials are likely to do what 
they think they are doing. No one does better than he tries 
t o  do. Whether we think of a systematic and predictable 
social control or only of a regime of ordering society by force; 
whether we think of authoritative formulations of what is 
believed t o  be right and just, or only of threats of applying 
state force; whether we think of objective application of a 
technique of decision, or only of the behavior of a particular 
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judge or official determined only by his individual psychology 
and environment-this, as the English-speaking world has 
thought since the seventeenth century, determines whether 
we live under law or under men. From the Middle Ages the 
Englishman has rejected a social control depending on the 
personality of an individual and has stood for one made t o  
the pattern of a constant and regular order of nature, oper- 
ating on principles, and a moral order equally constant and 
regular and rational, made t o  a pattern of an Eternal not 
ourselves who makes for righteousness. 
It is of the relation of religion to  law so conceived that I 
am to  speak to  you. If law is something different, if it is no 
more than what officials do because they have the power t o  
do it and so do it, we must be looking to Marxian political 
economics and Freudian psychology rather than t o  religion. 
Two great systems of law have ruled since the later Middle 
Ages, the civil law or modern Roman law, and the common 
law or legal system of England and by derivation of the 
English-speaking lands. I n  each of these there is a con- 
spicuous debt t o  religion in their formative eras in the 
Middle Ages. I n  the common law there is another con- 
spicuous debt in the era of the Puritan Revolution, the era 
when the supremacy of the law was firmly established, the 
era in which the fundamental doctrines of what became 
American public law were fixed in the struggle between the 
common-law courts and the crown. 
Tonight I speak of the medieval church and the law. 
Four leading ideas which guided the development of the 
two legal systems of the modern world took form and im- 
pressed themselves upon those systems under the influence 
of the church. They may be called the idea of universality, 
the idea of authority, the idea of good faith, and the idea of 
law behind and above laws. 
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From the twelfth century, when the study of Justinian’s 
law books in the Italian universities began the tradition of 
the modern Roman law and when the first treatise on English 
law was written, down to  the rise of nationalism after the 
Reformation, the church stood steadfastly for the idea of a 
universal law governing all Christendom. Indeed, the idea of 
universality pervaded every medieval institution and ac- 
tivity. Men believed in a universal church and the uni- 
versities taught a doctrine of a universal empire, each em- 
bracing all Christian lands and taking in all Christian people. 
There was a universal language for all official action. There 
was universal scholarship, promoted by universities t o  which 
students came from every land. There were universal ethical 
precepts and ethical customs of chivalry, and we are told 
how knights came from many countries t o  take part in 
tournaments and passed freely from land t o  land, thought of 
as Christians rather than as subjects of any particular sov- 
ereign. The  knight, the scholar, and the merchant were, if 
we put the matter in the secular political mode of speech of 
today, citizens of Christendom. In  the sixteenth century the 
division of Christendom into sects, the rise of strong central 
governments and growth of nationalism, and the rise of 
individualism upon the breakdown of the relationally organ- 
ized medieval society, led to  a decay of universal thought and 
universal institutions, But the idea had intrinsic vigor. It 
survived the era of nationalism and individualism, and not- 
withstanding the recrudescence of nationalism in the last 
twenty-five years, the idea of universality has been gaining in 
strength in an economically unified world in which men are 
coming once more to  think of relations and associations. It 
is reestablishing itself as we come t o  value community 
interests as well as individual personality interests and to 
weigh both in terms of a universal idea of civilization. We 
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turn to  it as we seek to  achieve human purposes through 
cooperation instead of solely through competitive self-asser- 
tion. The idea of universality is the antidote to  extravagant 
nationalism, as it was to  the extravagant localism of the 
earlier Middle Ages. 
I n  medieval politics and law there was a fundamental 
distinction between the spiritual jurisdiction of the church, 
that  is, of religiously organized Christendom, and the tem- 
poral jurisdiction of the state, that  is, of a particular po- 
litically organized society. Each had its own province in 
which it was paramount. A higher fundamental law kept 
each to  its own domain. Hence when before the Reformation 
Parliament sought t o  make the King an ecclesiastical person, 
the English Court of Common Pleas in 1506 refused t o  give 
effect t o  the statute. When Parliament, supreme in matters 
temporal, sought t o  act in matters spiritual, its acts were of 
no force-as the older cases put it, they were “impertinent 
t o  be observed.” 
After the Reformation, with the separation of church and 
state, the idea of a spiritual jurisdiction over everyday af- 
fairs gave way and politically organized society became the 
paramount agency of social control. But the underlying idea 
of fundamental limitations upon political action survived 
and had important consequences in the New World. 
How the idea of a universal law of a universal church 
affected the law of politically organized society and gave a 
stamp t o  doctrines and institutions which has endured ever 
since, is best illustrated by the law of marriage. 
In  the Christian polity marriage was a matter for the 
church, not for the state. I n  the twelfth century the church 
made good its claim that marriage was in the cognizance of 
the church courts, not of the lay courts. But the church had 
not been required t o  have a legal theory of marriage. When 
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one was called for in the general development of law in and 
after the twelfth century, obviously it had to  be cosmopolitan 
and universal. Accordingly, the academic teachers of church 
law adopted from the Roman law, regarded as a universal 
system for Christendom, the idea that no form was required 
and that the substance of a marriage was present consent- 
consent “by words of the present”-to be husband and wife. 
Upon consummation by living together as such the marriage 
was complete. T o  this simple universal doctrine, adapted to  
all Christendom, the Roman Catholic church after the 
Reformation added a requirement of the presence of a priest, 
while Protestant countries, and after the French Revolution, 
Latin countries, added alternatives or requirements of civil 
marriage before a magistrate. These additions and changes 
took place in the era of nationalism and so differ widely in 
different countries and jurisdictions. But  the universal doc- 
trine of the twelfth century law of the church has maintained 
itself everywhere as the basis of the law on this subject. 
At the same time the canonists, or lawyers of the church, 
working on the same simple universal lines upon the texts 
of Scripture, and a few texts of the fathers of the church, 
developed another doctrine which has likewise endured, 
namely, the modern idea of marriage as a status, that  is, as a 
condition which cannot be terminated by the act of the 
parties but only by nature or by the law. 
Status means a condition or position before the law of 
which one cannot divest himself by his own act. Only the 
operation of time or of nature or the act of the law or of some 
other person can bring it t o  an end. For example, the minor 
must come of age, the alien must be made a citizen by law, 
the slave must be set free by his master. In  the maturity of 
Roman law marriage did not create such a status. The rela- 
tion might be terminated by mutual consent or by repudia- 
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tion of it by either party. The modern law throughout the 
Christian world is very different. It is based on the law of 
the church and followed from the theory of the canonists as 
t o  the indissolubility of a consummated marriage. After the 
Reformation, Protestant countries began to  allow divorce. 
But the doctrine had become established that  marriage 
created a status which could only be terminated by nature or 
by the law. Hence the modern world (except present-day 
Russia) has not gone back t o  the free marriage of the 
maturity of Roman law. The universal conception of the 
church law has endured, although the local divorce laws of 
today show every conceivable variation of procedure and of 
substantive grounds. The contrast suffices t o  indicate some- 
thing of the part which the ideal of a universal law of a uni- 
versal church has played in shaping the law of today. The  
resulting legal theory of marriage seems t o  be as stable and 
enduring as that of divorce is unstable and unsatisfactory. 
Again, the ideal of universality, the ideal of law developed 
in the universities with theological premises and the doctrine 
of the church behind it, led to  an academic teaching of one 
law which enabled the law in each locality to  develop rapidly 
and yet assuredly by availing itself of the best of juristic 
activity everywhere. The juristic thought of any part of 
Christendom was available in every other part. Students 
from every land went t o  the great universities of the time 
and came back with a fund of ideas of justice according t o  
law transcending the local customs and institutions of the 
feudal jurisdictions of the time. How this operated t o  create 
law instead of multiplying laws is brought out in the subject 
of what we call conflict of laws. When each feudal jurisdic- 
tion had its own peculiar local customary law and each 
Italian city-state its own local statutes, with the growth of 
commerce and business enterprise questions arose contin- 
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ually as t o  what law governed a particular transaction or 
situation as between the different local customs or local 
statutes where some of the parties lived or some part of the 
transaction took place or something was t o  be performed, 
Clearly a workable solution had t o  be on universal lines, 
It had to be one which would be accepted in all the jurisdic- 
tions concerned. The  universal idea was therefore exception- 
ally well fitted to  be the background of a solution. The 
medieval academic jurists drew a theory so well on simple 
lines generally acceptable, that  the law throughout Christen- 
dom has kept t o  those lines ever since. Tha t  the conflict of 
laws, continually more in evidence in an era of nationalism 
and aggravated by the idea of law as whatever is done 
officially in the particular time and place-that this conflict 
of laws is not a conflict of law is due chiefly t o  the universal 
ideal taught t o  medieval lawyers by the church. The uni- 
versal principles of Christian conduct, backed by the author- 
ity of the local political organization, was the idea which 
made possible the two great systems of law by which civil- 
ization is maintained and furthered in the world today. 
A universal law of marriage and a universal doctrine as t o  
the conflict of laws are by no means all that  the Christian 
idea of universality did for modern law. In  the i’vliddle Ages 
the sea law and the law merchant were thought of as bodies 
of universal law like the Roman law and the canon law. The  
church insisted on good faith in transactions and furthered 
movements for uniformity in customs of trade and com- 
merce. It came to  be assumed as a matter of course that 
commercial law must be as universal as commerce. In  spite 
of the rise of nationalism and resulting cult of local laws, 
admiralty and the law merchant have kept much of the uni- 
versality which was impressed upon them through the 
medieval universities in which the law of the church and the 
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lay law were taught side by side on a common background 
of Christian theology. 
A second idea which the law of the modern world owes to  
the church is the idea of reasoned development and applica- 
tion of authority. I n  the chaos and anarchy of the earlier 
Middle Ages the church alone made for stability and security. 
I n  the Anglo-Saxon laws the King does not command his 
people as subjects. H e  exhorts them as Christians to  keep 
the peace, While the Roman empire was still developing in 
strength the church was a growing force for social control. 
As the empire decayed, the church more and more took over 
the work of its legal order in adjusting human relations and 
guiding human conduct. When the Roman empire in the 
west fell and no general political organization of society took 
its place, the church remained more and more carrying on the 
fundamental task of civilized society, the orderly securing of 
competing interests and claims and demands of individuals 
so as t o  satisfy them as far as may be with a minimum of 
friction and waste. 
Christians had been taught not t o  go to  law with each 
other and so avoided the courts of the state and went instead 
to  the overseer or bishop of the local flock. Gradually they 
developed what became a system of law depending for its 
enforcement upon excommunication. By 500 A.D., a gen- 
eration before the codification of Roman law by Justinian in 
the east, there was a book collecting the canons or precepts 
of church law promulgated by the councils of the church. 
There was another such collection in the seventh century and 
another containing much apocryphal material in the ninth. 
We must remember that  local feudal tribunals were admin- 
istering a local customary law. Roman law was known only 
in abridgments of abridgments. There were no effective 
organs of legislation for politically organized society. At the 
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end of the ninth century Alfred, compiling the customs of his 
kingdom, told his people that  he “durst not set down much” 
of his own. The  time of conscious constructive lawmaking by 
lay lawmakers was far in the future. 
Thus it was the church that  made for universality and so 
for the uniformity and predictability in adjusting relations 
and ordering conduct demanded by the economic order in a 
civilized society. It made for these things by enjoining and 
enforcing courses of conduct called for by Christian morality. 
As the social order grew in complexity and questions of 
detail as t o  relations and items of conduct multiplied, there 
began t o  be manuals of church law. These are known as 
far back as the tenth century. In  the twelfth century Gratian 
compiled the canons and other materials in what became 
the foundation of the body of the canon law. It was studied 
and commented on in the universities and was followed by 
collections of the decisions and legislation of the later Popes 
and so grew into an elaborate body of law, not complete 
until the beginning of the fourteenth century. We need 
t o  remember that the canon law was mature as a modern 
system on many points of the law governing the relations of 
man with man long before the modern Roman law and very 
much longer before the English common law had reached a 
like development. 
For a thousand years from the breakdown of the Roman 
empire in the west to the Reformation, men valued their 
relation t o  the spiritual. For nearly four hundred years 
after the Reformation they valued liberty, giving it a spirit- 
ual value. Law was to  secure liberty. Constitutions were 
t o  be guarantees of liberties, not merely frames of govern- 
ment. A new idea, to compete with the idea of liberty, 
begins with Marx, about the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, when he interpreted history as the record of the 
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progressive unfolding or realizing of the idea of a maximum 
satisfaction of material human wants. The  relation of man 
to  the spiritual has no place in this conception of life. Like- 
wise liberty, which interferes with a maximum efficiency of 
satisfying material wants, can find no place. Hence fashions 
of thought of today, deriving directly or indirectly from 
Marx, are scornful of the ideas which had given continuity 
to  social and legal development from the time when order 
began to  arise from the wreck of the empire in the west. 
But behind those ideas, if we look at  them from an earthly 
standpoint only, is the idea of civilization, the idea of raising 
human powers t o  their highest possible unfolding, the idea 
of the maximum of human control over external nature and 
over internal nature, which has enabled mankind t o  inherit 
the earth and t o  maintain and increase tha t  inheritance. 
Control over external nature, which has made such strides 
in the immediate past and of which we make so much today, 
rests upon the control over internal nature which has made 
i t  possible for men t o  set themselves to  the task of harnessing 
physical forces t o  their use. Behind this control over human 
nature is social control, and for ages that  has been chiefly 
control through law. What then is behind law? Men began 
to  think about such things again in the twelfth century, after 
philosophy had been long in abeyance. I n  the beginnings 
of law in the modern world the church taught, and lawyers 
learned from the church and have since assumed, that  what 
lay behind law in all of its senses was authority. Law must 
rest on some ultimate unchallengeable authority above the 
reach of the arbitrary will or caprice of any man or set of men. 
I n  the Middle Ages there were taken t o  be three bases of 
authority: the Bible and the writings of the fathers of the 
church, the legislation of Justinian, the Christian lawgiver, 
and Aristotle, or a t  least the logical philosophical method 
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derived from him. These were to  be interpreted and applied 
but not questioned. For the universal canon law the Bible 
was the ultimate authority. For the universal civil law 
Justinian provided the authoritative materials. For both 
Aristotle provided the authoritative technique of interpret- 
ing and applying them. The  scholastic philosophy, the 
philosophy of the medieval church, gave to  both the canon 
law and the civil law organization, and definition to  the ideal 
of authority, and thus enabled jurists t o  go forward with 
confidence in the development of the received legal materials. 
Following a period of anarchy and disunion and violence, 
men sought order and organization and peace. They sought 
a philosophy which would bolster up authority and put in 
rational form the need of imposing a legal yoke upon in- 
dividuals and of keeping down anti-social activities. Scholas- 
tic philosophy, with its reliance on dialectical development 
of authoritatively given premises, its faith in formal logic, 
and its central problem of putting reason as a foundation 
under authority, responded well t o  these demands. It was 
the theological philosophy of the church which enabled the 
commentators of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to 
put the Roman law of Justinian in a form t o  be received and 
administered in the Europe of seven centuries later. It was 
in the form acquired during this period, and chiefly in the 
form of the commentaries of Bartolus, that  Roman law spread 
over Europe from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. 
The  commentators used the ideal of authority to make law 
out of the only materials a t  hand which could claim some 
universal validity. Thus the ideas of universality and of 
authority were behind the establishing of what is now the 
legal system of more than half of the world. 
But there was other work for the idea of authority t o  do, 
and it achieved the task through the theologian philosophers 
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of the later Middle Ages. Reason was appealed t o  in order 
t o  sustain authority. The  thirteenth and fourteenth-century 
philosophers of the church had to  demonstrate the basis of 
authority of man-made laws, and the basis, as men then 
thought, had t o  be one of unchallengeable authority. They 
had to  reconcile, if they could, the ideal of the King or the 
state ruling by and under the law with the ideal of a universal 
law of the universal empire enacted by a Christian Roman 
emperor. The  philosophers’ solution of the apparent con- 
tradiction between the ideal of law as the ascertained and 
declared justice and truth of the Creator, and the ideal of 
law as the enactment of a Roman emperor was a theory 
of eternal law, the reason of the divine wisdom governing 
the universe, and of a natural law, proceeding ultimately 
from God, but immediately from human reason and govern- 
ing the actions of men only. T h e  positive law, the enacted 
law promulgated by sovereigns, was a mere recognition and 
declaration of the natural law which was above all human 
authority. When, however, we have positive law so estab- 
lished, we have something authoritative, something which 
we can postulate as of final authority, the content of which 
we can develop analytically and by logical unfolding. The 
method of postulating an authoritative text and interpreting 
it, as the medieval lawyers worked it out as a received ideal 
on the analogy of authoritative interpretation of the Bible, 
has endured as part of the legal equipment of the modern 
world. T h e  Middle Ages left as a permanent contribution 
t o  the science of law the method of insuring certainty and 
stability by logical development of the content of authori- 
tatively established precepts. We owe this method, the 
oldest, most generally used, and most effective instrument 
in the lawyer’s tool box t o  the jurist theologians, and theo- 
logian philosophers of the church, working side by side with 
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the lawyers who as doctors of the civil as well as the canon 
law shaped the formative modern Roman law. 
A third great idea which modern law received from the 
medieval church is the idea of good faith. In  a developed 
economic order men must be able to assume that  those with 
whom they deal in the ordinary intercourse of society will 
act in good faith and so will make good the reasonable expec- 
tations created by their promises or other conduct. It is a 
long time, however, before the legal order gives much 
security to  this assumption. The first function of the law 
is t o  keep the peace and a long struggle between kin organiza- 
tion and political organization keeps the law confined to a 
relatively narrow field of social control in the earlier stages 
of its development. After the state has become the para- 
mount agency of social control, and the law has developed 
as a specialized form of social control through the force of 
politically organized society, the law moves slowly in the 
field of enforcing promises, which had been left t o  religion 
and the pressure of public opinion. Roman law in its 
classical period was very far from enforcing promises simply 
as such. In  the course of centuries the sphere of enforceable 
agreements and promises had widened without any idea of 
a general enforcement of them. Forms had relaxed and in- 
formal categories had been added, but when Justinian codi- 
fied the law in the sixth century there was still no general 
principle that promises were to  be kept. Indeed, the Roman 
law handed down two ideas which have embarrassed the law 
and thought about the law ever since. One is an idea that  
there are and ought t o  be possible and permissible promises 
and agreements intentionally made with an expectation of 
performance which are not recognized by law. Another is an 
idea that there must be some reason for legal enforcement of 
promises and agreements other than the making of them and 
the reasonable expectation they create. 
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On the fall of the western empire there was a long interval 
of retrogression in the adjustment of relations and regulation 
of conduct by politically organized society. The law of the 
Germanic peoples who had invaded western Europe knew 
only of primitive types of contract derived from the custom 
of giving hostages or pledging oneself as a hostage for the 
keeping of a promise. The  Christian went t o  the Bishop, and 
the Bishop enforced, not the legal duties enjoined by the 
Roman law, but the moral duties incumbent upon Christians. 
For centuries the Bishops and the church courts were the 
effective agencies of upholding civilization through social 
control of relations and of conduct. Performance of promises 
and agreements was exacted of the Christian by the church 
courts on the basis of Christian morals without regard t o  
form, and without looking t o  the legal reasons for enforce- 
ment in the categories of enforceable contract in the Roman 
law. A council of Carthage in the fourth century laid down 
that  agreements, even bare agreements not recognized by the 
civil law, were none the less t o  be observed. Gregory the Great 
(A.D. 600) laid down that the judge should bestir himself 
vigorously to  see t o  it that  promises be performed. I n  the 
thirteenth century, when the Decretals of Gregory IX were 
repeating these pronouncements, the customary law of the 
time called for forms or special reasons for enforcement. I n  
contrast, the law of the church started with the proposition, 
denied by the Roman law, that  obligation arose simply from 
consent. I n  the eyes of the church the man who did not keep 
his promise committed a sin. He incurred ecclesiastical pen- 
alties. All forms, in the view of the church law, were super- 
fluous. The only condition of validity was tha t  the purpose 
of making it should be lawful and moral. While the modern 
Roman law, developing in the universities, was still in a stage 
of strict law and ignored the moral aspects of transactions 
126 Law and Religion 
and situations; while the narrow ideas of the Geimanic law 
as t o  enforceable agreements were still adhered t o  in the lay 
tribunals, and the lay law was seeking certainty through rule 
and form, the church held it not so important that  rules be  
certain as that  men’s conduct be certain and were enforcing 
moral duties of good faith as legal duties. 
I n  the modern Roman law, under the influence of the law 
of the church, reason for making a promise became reason 
for enforcing it. Intent t o  incur an obligation was a reason 
for making it and so a reason for enforcing it. The extension 
of the idea of good faith over the whole domain of legal trans- 
actions, which sets off the modern Roman law from the 
Roman law of antiquity, is due not t o  a straight-line evolu- 
tion from the Roman texts but t o  the influence of the 
church, contact with the canon law, and the identification 
of the legal with the moral and consequent stress upon good 
faith in the doctrine of natural law. 
I n  the canon law the pressure of the church was brought 
t o  bear upon a promisor t o  compel him to  keep his word. 
Ecclesiastical censures, penances, and in grave cases an 
ultimate excommunication coerced a specific performance of 
what he had promised unless in some particular case exact 
performance in kind had become impracticable or would 
operate inequitably. It was otherwise in the Roman law. 
The Romans held tha t  every obligation must have a pecu- 
niary value. It was enforced normally by a judgment for 
that  value. Here, again, the idea of the church has pre- 
vailed. In  the modern Roman law, unless there are reasons 
t o  the contrary, the promisor must perform as good faith 
dictates. 
In  Anglo-American common law we have not progressed 
so far, The reason seems to  be that  in England there was 
less contact with and influence of the law of the church. I n  
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1164, in the compromise between Henry I1 and the church 
called the Constitutions of Clarendon, it is provided tha t  
“pleas concerning debts shall be in the jurisdiction of the 
King irrespective of whether they were accompanied by a 
pledge of faith or not.” English law was taught and lawyers 
and future judges were trained in the professional societies 
of lawyers, the Inns of Court; not in the universities as on 
the Continent. Thus the contact of church law and lay law 
which was so close where civil law and canon law were taught 
and commented on by the same teachers or by teachers side 
by side in the universities was wanting in England. The 
significant development of our common law begins in the 
thirteenth century. The common law as t o  contracts had 
been cut off from influence of the church law a century 
before. 
But while the church had no influence to  speak of upon the 
common law of contract, it had a decisive and salutary 
influence in giving us, through the Court of Chancery, a 
category of fiduciary obligations, arising from relations of 
trust and confidence, in which duties of good faith are main- 
tained and enforced t o  the utmost and specific enforcement 
of what the moral duty calls for is the rule. The clerical 
chancellors enforced duties of good faith against fiduciaries 
because, as a clerical chancellor put i t  in the reign of Henry 
VII, “every law is or ought t o  be according to  the law of 
God.” A great department of our modern law in the Eng- 
lish-speaking world has been built upon this foundation. 
A fourth great idea which the law owes to  the medieval 
church is that  of a fundamental ideal law, usually spoken 
of as natural law. The  teachers of the civil law in twelfth- 
century Italy repeated for a time the first stage in the 
development of law by lawyers in working out rules by 
drawing distinctions between texts and formulating princi- 
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ples behind the distinctions and reducing the principles t o  
maxims. Long before this the church had been insisting upon 
something more than rules. It had been urging moral 
principles and moral conceptions, and building a body of 
law by means of them. Most of all, however, the lawyers of 
the church and the theologian philosophers of the church 
took over from the Roman law the idea of natural law-the 
conception of an ideal law fundamental for all social control 
by politically organized society-and made of it the chief 
instrument of creative lawmaking and the great liberalizing 
agency in law for the modern world. 
In  the teaching of the fathers of the church, while the 
authority of the ruler was sacred, it was the task of the ruler 
t o  uphold justice and righteousness and hence one was not 
truly a ruler unless he governed his people righteously and 
with equity. This theological political doctrine was well 
developed in medieval political thought by the ninth century. 
Later it becomes important as a legal doctrine. I n  both 
aspects it has played an important r6le in shaping the law 
under which we live. 
As a theory of a fundamental higher law limiting the action 
of rulers and ruling authorities of every description and 
requiring them in medieval phrase t o  rule under God and the 
law, i t  has given direction to  the development of public law 
in the English-speaking world and has been a controlling 
force in our American constitutional law. As a theory of an 
ideal body of principles discoverable by reason to  which 
lawmaking and the interpretation and application of legal 
precepts ought t o  conform it has been a force for liberaliza- 
tion of the legal system in two eras of growth, the develop- 
ment of equity and absorption of the law merchant in seven- 
teenth and eighteenth-century England and the making over 
of the received English law in nineteenth-century America. 
The Medieval Church and the Law 129 
I n  the sixteenth century there were jurists who sought t o  
divorce from theology and religion the ideal law, the body 
of rationally discovered principles t o  which law and law- 
making ought t o  conform. I n  the nineteenth century there 
were those who ought t o  divorce law from the ideal and 
make i t  rest wholly upon the force of politically organized 
society, or of those who exercise its powers. I n  the present 
century there are those who seek to  divorce the adjustment 
of relations and ordering of conduct from law and leave only 
a regime of force applied t o  each case as it arises and acting 
without ideal objective or reasoned guides t o  decision. T o  
them law is a disappearing phenomenon. One of them, 
indeed, considers it only a superstition. Even among those 
who do not go t o  the extreme and reject law as meaning 
anything other than what is actually done officially in adjust- 
ing relations in some particular time and place, the ideas 
which came into the law from the medieval church are under 
attack. Nationalism has buffeted mightily against the idea 
of universality. Impatient reformers have heavily bom- 
barded the idea of authority. The analytical jurist who can 
only see law as an aggregate of laws and thinks of a law as a 
threat of definite detailed constraint by those who wield the 
force of politically organized society, attached t o  a pro- 
nouncement as t o  a definite detailed state of facts, rejects the 
idea of good faith and all standards containing a moral 
element coming down from a loose-thinking, superstitious 
past. The  skeptical realist sees in natural law a superstition 
piled on another superstition, hardly worth the trouble of 
combatting it. Thus the ideas handed down to  modern law 
by the medieval church are all under violent attack. But so 
is the law itself; and in the land where the disappearance of 
law has been preached most zealously, so is religion and all 
its works. 
